What was considered a purely humanitarian initiative when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Somalia on 19 August 2011 has now turned out to be a comprehensive Somalia and Eastern Africa policy for Turkey. This, in itself, has important repercussions for Turkey’s opening to Africa and beyond.

Turkey’s Somalia policy is the best current example of inter-agency coordina- tion within the context of Turkey’s foreign policy. Through this experience, Turk- ish policy makers have learned that regularly held coordination meetings are not enough. A maximized level of coordination and a well-planned vision are essen- tial requirements to a successful enterprise. In addition, coordination meetings on Somalia had to go beyond being a purely check-list mechanism of what has been done. A genuine discussion for creating a sustainable political vision had to be developed.

The need for a clear political vision and plan stems from the reality that Tur- key’s Somalia policy is no longer simply an effort to coordinate technical and hu- manitarian aid. In this context, for the first time in Turkish foreign policy, ap- pointing a special Somali representative is crucial. Furthermore, an assessment

9

TURKEY’S INVOLVEMENT IN SOMALIA: ASSESMENT OF A STATE-BUILDING IN PROGRESS

should be made on the political developments occurring in, and surroundings of, Somalia, monitored and analyzed daily to improve on the decision-making process in Ankara. Thus, this situation underscores the imperative for a special representative with a political mission to be appointed.

After three years of involvement, some government agencies operating in So- malia have shown signs of "Somalia Fatigue.” This will be one of the critical issues in the coming years. The main cause of Somalia Fatigue is the lack of a clearly de- fined roadmap and the absence of planning. Policy makers and agencies should be able to prepare for worst-case scenarios and be able to criticize their own policies. Somalia Fatigue could only be resolved by the appointment of special representa- tive, who knows the region and has the ability to create a vision for Turkey’s role in East Africa.

Turkey’s "Somali experience” has made major contributions to its aid poli- cies. First, the Somalian experience has set a great example because Turkey had to create an archive for aid politics. Second, Turkish aid organizations did not use local Somalian aid groups to guide them, which is the approach other countries take, instead Turkey directly approached Somalia. This enabled Turkish aid orga- nizations to receive accurate information and find solutions to the problems and questions. Third, Turkey is in the process of developing or articulating a human development model. Therefore, the Somalian experience has served to create a distinctive model for this purpose.

Turkey should consider two important issues for future policies in Somalia: First, Turkey’s "super country” image that has been idealized by many in Somalia and abroad since 2011 should be normalized. This image is not sustainable in the long-term. Second, Turkey should pay careful attention to its "dominant” image in the Somali case. Even Turkey’s smallest contribution in Somalia can attract "all” the attention, as no other country is actually active in Somalia. Turkey’s domi- nant image is actually discomforting for many. This could work against Turkey. It would be advantageous for Turkey to establish joint projects with other countries. This will help Turkey to develop a new approach to Somalia, and with the involve- ment of other actors, both the burden and credit will be shared.

10

INTRODUCTION

Turkey’s policy on Somalia is intertwined with his general policy on Africa. In con- sidering Turkey’s actions in Somalia, its African foreign policy must be examined closely. Turkey’s interest in Africa can be said to have really started in 1998. Howev- er, its involvement in Somalia has only been since 2011. Ankara’s policy on Somalia has become a "litmus test” for Turkey’s policy on Africa. The results and the con- sequences of Turkey’s policy on Somalia will undoubtedly shape the view of other African countries towards Turkey. Although Turkey would like to strengthen its re- lations and policies in Africa, it’s a two-way streak and Africa has to be receptive for cooperation to exist. The African countries desire and receptiveness towards Tur- key’s involvement in the continent is directly proportional to how they perceive Tur- key’s reliability and respectability within the region. Any accomplishment or failure in Somali policy will significantly determine the view of the region towards Turkey. Thus, Turkey’s policy on Somalia is key to its relations with Africa as a whole.

Turkey’s policy on Somalia over the past three years must be seriously eval- uated and all aspects must be thoroughly analyzed. A critical assessment of Tur- key’s accumulated experience since 2011 by decision-makers and practitioners would open the doors to improve the organization and policy practices for the future. Additionally, learning from the previous mistakes would strengthen and expand Turkey’s policy on Somalia.

Turkish policy on Somalia is made up of various "firsts” for Turkey. Turkey, for the first time ever, began to follow a strategy of state building within a conti-

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TURKEY’S INVOLVEMENT IN SOMALIA: ASSESMENT OF A STATE-BUILDING IN PROGRESS

nent where it has little experience.1 When Prime Minister Erdoğan and his del- egation visited Somalia on August 19, 2011, it was a new experience for many. In 1993, Turkey directly encountered many of the grave problems Somalia faces through the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations under the command of Çe- vik Bir. However, there was no life-changing impact on the ground because the mission was considered unsuccessful by many.2 Therefore, Turkey’s direct interest on the issue since 2011 was never understood well and it appeared to many that Turkey was going to drop its involvement in Somalia all together soon after fac- ing the difficult reality on the ground. Nevertheless, Turkey did become involved more each year in state building process in Somalia since 2011 because what was found on the ground was not more than non-functioning and old-fashioned in- stitutions. Once the policy initiative was launched, Turkey’s efforts gained mo- mentum in three years. Interestingly, this caused some to become uncomfortable with the situation. The attack on the Turkish embassy in Somalia by Al-Shabaab and the killing of a Turkish police officer was part of the discomfort for Turkish involvement in Somalia.

An additional first for Turkey is the shared experience with the entry of NGOs and government organizations to re-build Somalia as a country together. The State building effort would only be possible if these organizations worked and coordinated together, which was a new practice for Turkish foreign policy. For the very first time, government organizations and NGOs worked towards a com- mon goal. This engendered a shared experience and collective memory. Although these two types of entities have worked together somewhat in various African countries, Somalia created an example of a strong "culture of partnership.” How- ever, the entente was not perfect and competitive approaches caused difficulties at times. Still, the lessons learned were highly important and are useful for better results in the future.

The "unification” under a common umbrella of the NGOs, the government, and even Turkey’s opposition party in Turkey in its efforts in Somalia was another "first” within Turkish foreign policy. The visit to Somalia on August 2011, by the main opposition party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu3 and his delegation, not only in-

1. Mansur Akgün, "Somali’de yeni bir devlet inşa ediyoruz,” Star, 22 December 2012; Kani Torun, "Somali’yi baştan inşa ediyoruz”, Bugün, 7 October 2012.

2. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Washington, DC.: United States Institute of Peace, 1995.

3. "Kılıçdaroğlu Somali’ye gitti,” Hürriyet, 31 August 201112

dicated the profound public support towards the Somalia policy by Turkish society but also indicated a broader political support, including the opposition. With that being said, the policy on Somalia must be viewed as one of great consensus within Turkey on a foreign policy issue. Even with the attack on the Turkish embassy re- sulting in the death of one Turkish police officer there is no sign of serious criticism.

However, the flip side is that there has been no real interest from the academic, intellectual or research centers on Turkey’s efforts in Somalia over the past three years, despite opening of some research centers on Africa in several universities in Turkey. Various foreign institutions and research centers, including the Internation- al Crisis Group have prepared meetings and wrote reports on the matter,4 whereas few studies on the issue coming from Turkey have not gone further than summa- rizing the history of Somalia or providing general information about Somalia. 5 The academic community in Turkey normally shows a special interest on the areas that are intensive focus of Turkish foreign policy, however, this has not been the case for Somalia as a research subject.6 This neglect by the academic and intellectual com- munity not only limits potential policy discussions on Somalia but also does not provide the opportunity for policy makers to develop a clear roadmap.

The visit to Somalia on August 2011, by the main opposition party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, not only indicated the pro- found public support towards the Somalia policy by Turkish society but also indicated a broader political support, including the opposition.

Another "first” for Turkey in Somalia is Ankara’s peacemaking role for Soma- lia’s internal sustainability and security. When Turkey arranged a meeting for So- mali President Hasan Sheikh Mahmud and Somaliland President Ahmed Silanyo in Ankara on April 13, 2013, it created an initiative towards serious peace making within Somalia. Those leaders, who normally do not even communicate with each

4. For example see Pınar Tank, "Turkey’s new humanitarian approach in Somalia,” The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) Policy Brief, December 2013; ICG Report, "Assessing Turkey’s Role in Somalia,” Af- rica Briefing, No 92, 8 October 2012; and Teri Murphy and Auveen Woods, Turkey’s International Development Framework Case Study: Somalia, IPC-Mercator Policy Brief, February 2014.

5. For example see Tuğba Evrim Maden, "Somali’de Bitmeyen Siyasi Kriz,” ORSAM Report, No 163, July 2013.

6. For a rare research see, Pınar Akpınar, "Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian Diplo- macy,” Turkish Studies, Vol 14, No 4, 2013, pp. 735-757.

INTRODUCTION

TURKEY’S INVOLVEMENT IN SOMALIA: ASSESMENT OF A STATE-BUILDING IN PROGRESS

other, came together in Ankara, under Turkey’s initiative. They signed the Ankara Communiqué and agreed not to use any provocative language against each other. Turkey was successful in this diplomatic undertaking.

In general, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia on August 2011, accom- panied by a large delegation, was viewed at internal and international levels as a purely humanitarian mission based on the idea of supplying short-term aid. There- fore, many western governments believed that Ankara would soon realize the dire and complex issues that Somalia faces. Meanwhile in Turkey, opposition claimed that the humanitarian aid initiative toward Somalia was being used as part of do- mestic policy propaganda. However, today, it is increasingly clear that Turkey’s in- volvement in Somalia is no longer just a matter of humanitarian aid; instead it is a political matter, which includes a nation-state rebuilding process.

A key point that should be underscored is that Turkey has entered into an era of its foreign policy with Africa based on the Somalia initiative. Somalia has become a test case, reflecting Turkey’s political power in Africa but also in assess- ing the impact that Turkey can have in Africa. Prime Minister Erdoğan and his diplomatic team’s efforts to bring to the UN and find workable solutions to the issues of hunger and the Somali political quagmire; preparing various meetings to initiate the restructuring of Somalia; and finally the Ankara Communiqué all demonstrate Turkey’s endeavors to find a long-term solution for Somalia.

This new era of Turkish-African relations has introduced a policy strategy that is far beyond the classical view on economic and political development as well as trade relations. In particular, this brought Turkey to the forefront in con- tributing to the restructuring of the Somali state and its sustainability. Turkey, over the last two years, has been carrying out development projects in Somalia. Various public institutions such as TIKA, AFAD, Diyanet, and Kizilay along with numerous Turkish NGOs such as the IHH, Cansuyu, Hudayi Foundation, Kimse Yok Mu, and Deniz Feneri have directly participated in these projects di- rectly and indirectly. However, a number of questions can be raised, as a conse- quence of this flurry of activity by the Turkish government, private companies, and NGOs in Somalia. Is there a coherent political plan or strategy behind this involvement and should there be? Are these activities being monitored in any way? How successful has Turkey been in attempting to raise the Somalia issue on a regional and global scale, and, consequently, creating political solutions? Finally, what kind of policy must be put into place to foster sustainable peace and development in Somalia?

14

So far, neither the Turkish government nor the other Turkish actors involved in Somalia have offered any clear answers to these questions. It appears that the So- malia case is considered to be a quasi-internal political issue because of the exten- sive involvement and interest of many state institutions in Turkey. Unfortunately, there is no real data covering the activities of these various state, private, and civil society activities to allow for a proper analysis. This dearth of information weakens the ability of government agencies and NGOs to formulate appropriate day-to-day policies and works against their ability to plan for the long term. To counter this reality, the first purpose of this study is to provide a reference point for Ankara’s Somalia policy. Second, it will also attempt to provide a critical assessment of the policies made by Turkey and their effectiveness. Third, it will give suggestions for the near future.

In this context, this study emerged through the general literature and debates on the issue as well as the interviews conducted regarding the topic and results from the workshops attended by various institutions. This study primarily aims to provide an analysis on a regional and global scale while providing insight into the actions of Turkish institutions and organizations in Somalia. Turkey’s three year- long experience in Somalia is the basis of this study. The goal is to constructively contribute to establishing a clear paradigm and planning for this type of work.

INTRODUCTION

15

SOMALIA IN THE CONTEXT OF TURKEY’S AFRICA POLICY

Since the beginning of Turkey’s African initiative in 1998, none of the develop- ments in Africa has attracted Turkey’s attention as much as the hunger crisis in Eastern Africa, especially in Somalia. Turkey-Africa relations mark a new era in Turkish foreign policy owing to the heightened sensitivity shown by the Turkish public, the ruling party and the opposition party, as well as NGOs. To put Turkey’s current active policy in Somalia into context, an overview of Turkey’s foreign pol- icy towards Africa should be considered. Turkey’s foreign policy towards Africa can be delineated into three basic periods during the post-Cold War era. First period is between 1998 and 2005; second is between 2005-2011, and the last one is the ongoing process since Turkey’s Somalia policy in 2011.7

Turkey’s active foreign policy towards Africa began in 1998. It was the year of the "Opening up to Africa Plan.” Thus, the first phase ran between 1998 and 2005. In particular, 2005 was declared internationally to be the "Year of Africa.” This was a watershed year and must be examined closely as a period of infra- structure development and diplomatic preparation for Turkey’s African policy. The second phase from 2005-2011 should be viewed as a period of strength- ening relationships and reinforcing Turkey’s diplomatic presence through the

7. For an overall assessment and periodization see Mehmet Ozkan, "A New Actor or Passer-By? The Political Economy of Turkey’s Engagement with Africa,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol 14, No 1, 2012, pp. 113–133; Mehmet Ozkan, and Birol Akgun, "Turkey’s Opening to Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 48, No 4, 2010, pp. 525–546.

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TURKEY’S INVOLVEMENT IN SOMALIA: ASSESMENT OF A STATE-BUILDING IN PROGRESS

opening of embassies. This period also signaled Turkey’s increased interest towards Africa as a place where Turkey would develop long-term relationship with many African countries. For that aim, Turkey has strengthened its involve- ment in international organizations related to Africa. It is now an observer in the African Union; it has become a member of the African Development Bank; and most importantly it organized the Turkey-Africa Summit in Istanbul, in 2008. The Summit was focused on rapidly growing trade relations and civil so- ciety activities, developing social and commercial relationships, and seeking to re-establish their mutual interests. The third period of Turkey-Africa relations began in August 2011 with Turkey’s involvement to alleviate the hunger crisis in Somalia and taking a leadership role on this issue. This is the phase that will be the main source in evaluating Turkey’s real effect impact in Africa. It will also serve to determine to what extent Turkish political "power” can exert influence to solve Africa’s problems.

Turkey’s active engagement in Somalia is a reflection of its great interest in the future of Somalia, in particular, and of the continent, generally. Additionally, Turkey is seeking to reinforce and strengthen its presence as a new political actor. The significant amount of development and humanitarian aid Turkey has poured into the country as well as increased commercial developments are the main bridges of its new Africa policy. Additionally, religion is an important factor and is perceived as a legitimate basis for its involvement. In addition to government organizations, such as the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet), NGOs have been actively engaging and supporting Turkey-Africa relations. Ankara’s policy in Somalia and other African countries will demonstrate that Turkey is not only an economic power but also a political power. In this study, various aspects and levels of this relationship will be discussed.

Although Ankara appears to be more of a political actor, it has recently in- creased its efforts to help in resolving Africa’s problems. To this end, Turkey or- ganized a conference along with the UN in Istanbul on May 21, 2012, entitled "Preparing Somalia’s Future: Goal 2015.” Fifty-seven countries and eleven re- gional and international organizations attended this conference to address water, energy, transportation, and racism issues. The conference set out a roadmap for the re-establishment of Somalia and presented a five-point comprehensive plan for state reconstruction. This five-point plan included the followings themes: the establishment of national unity, the creation of a new political system, a compre- hensive structuring of economy, the configuration of national Somali forces, and

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SOMALIA IN THE CONTEXT OF TURKEY’S AFRICA POLICY

the development of the country.8 As Turkey’s relations with Somalia continue to be strengthened, deputy prime ministers and many other ministers make official visits to follow-up with the projects. As a result, Somalia has become a quasi- in- ternal issue for Turkey’s government and society.

Turkey’s presence in Somalia is different in some aspects, as compared to other actors within the region. First of all, the nature and implementation of hu- manitarian aid is one of the differences. Turkey’s goal is to achieve long-term de- velopment projects in the region mostly in micro level that touches people’s live directly and rapidly. Secondly, the common religion of Islam plays an import- ant role in legitimizing Turkey’s presence in Somalia, as opposed to Western and non-Western actors. Thus, religion is the major reason for them to trust Turks and their "work ethic.” Turkish schools in Africa have rapidly increased and have successfully trained a new generation of self-sufficient educators. This is critical for the development and modernization of the continent. However, certain Turk- ish schools activities – not referring to those run only by Gulenists but also many other Turkish NGOs – , their approached to education, and methods could be compared to the nineteenth century European missionary approach. Efforts in education, in particular, are thought to potentially re-shape and change the path of Africa’s future social dynamics.

Turkey’s active engagement in Somalia is a reflection of its great interest in the future of Somalia, in particular, and of the continent, generally.

Despite these differences, Turkey’s long-term socio-political existence and stability in the region depends not only on increasing trade relations but also on ef- forts in finding durable solutions for the African continent’s problems, which are similar to Somalia. If Turkey is able to contribute to peace and security in Somalia, it could then join the group of powerful political nations, along with the USA, France and Britain, who are interested in promoting the continent’s economic and political stability, instead of being part of the group that has only economic interests in Africa, such as India, China, and Brazil.

8. "United Somalia a Must: Davutoglu,” Al Shahid, 10 December 2012.

TURKEY’S INVOLVEMENT IN SOMALIA: ASSESMENT OF A STATE-BUILDING IN PROGRESS

Somalia’s example is not only an important turning point for Turkey-Soma- lia relations but also reflects Turkey’s strategy to be one of the major players in promoting Africa’s development. Turkey’s successes or failures could potentially shape priorities in Turkey’s Africa as well as determine how Africa and other ac- tors in the region will perceive Turkey in the upcoming years.

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TURKEY’S SOMALIA POLICY

In the summer of 2011 a disastrous draught hit Somalia, combined with the on- going years of civil conflict caused Somalia to declare its first official declaration of "famine.”9 Somalia’s declaration that it was starving, given the magnitude and severity, was a dangerous alarm. Somalia’s dire predicament meant a three-dimen- sional burnout for its people: First, Somalis were unable to maintain their liveli- hood as their agricultural production was insufficient to even ensure a minimum amount of food and drink. Second, the majority of the population had no access to their government officials. Third, Somalis had neither the power nor the oppor- tunity to alleviate their indigent conditions. Government and NGOs began their activities in Somalia prompted by the public opinion’s concern seeing the desti- tute situation of the Somalis. Moreover, concern was heightened and the Islamic world was all the more touch by this plight, as it occurred during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Turkey was among the first of these countries to act.

Turkey’s visit to Somalia, in 2011, at the Prime Ministry level was intended to put the spot light on the horrors of starvation and to grab the world’s attention and focus it on the tragedy happening in the region. However, the objectives of some of the government organizations as well as certain well-known NGOs evolved with the goal of promoting the "contribution to the development of a self-suffi-

9. Nisar Majid and Stephen McDowell, "Hidden Dimensions of the Somalia Famine,” Global Food Policy, Vol 1, No 1, 2012, pp..36-42.

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TURKEY’S INVOLVEMENT IN SOMALIA: ASSESMENT OF A STATE-BUILDING IN PROGRESS

cient Somalia,” under the banner of aid activities. Turkey’s Somali policy displays a multi-dimensional and also multi-actor situation when compared to the policies implemented by other countries. In order to understand this multi-dimensional and multi-actor structure, a conceptual sense for Turkey’s policy in Somalia is necessary. Later on, the activities done by all the actors who are part of Ankara’s Somalia politics will be documented. Turkey’s Somalia policy can be categorized and analyzed essentially under seven categories:

EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN AID

Emergency Humanitarian aid was the first step in Turkey’s involvement in So- malia. It was launched following the scores of deaths caused by the drought and famine in Somalia and Western Africa in 2011, mentioned above. Turkey became aware of this crisis through the international media, as it previously had not been an issue on Turkey’s policy agenda. On August 19 2011, Prime Minister Erdoğan visited the capital city of Somalia, Mogadishu accompanied by a large delegation, which included his wife Emine Erdoğan, his daughter Sümeyye Erdoğan, Depu- ty Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, and other ministers and executives. 10 Besides the fact that this was the first official visit to Somalia’s capital city Mogadishu in the last twenty years by the Turkish govern- ment and its ruling party leader, the visit brought this subject to the attention of the international community, and in particular the Turkish public. Already, Turk- ish society’s attention had been directed to the Somali crisis when a high profile delegation of parliamentarians and entertainment artists, such as Sertab Erener, Nihat Dogan, Ajda Pekkan, Muazzez Ersoy, along with businessmen such as the President of TÜSIAD, Ümit Boyner, and the President of ASO, Nurettin Özdebir, visited Somalia.

At that time, the goal of the Prime Minister and his delegation was mainly to provide emergency humanitarian aid for the people in need rather than establish a long-term Somalia policy. Turkey sent a large amount of food aid and other necessities, and launched a variety of campaigns to stem the crisis in Somalia. Turkey’s policy of aid over rhetoric garnered appreciation not only from the So- malis but also foreign countries. This aid provided Turkey with legitimacy when it developed its subsequent policies towards Somalia.

10. "Başbakan Somali’de,” Sabah, 19 August 2011.22

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Development assistance has been one of Turkey’s soft power strategies in its for- eign policy arsenal in recent years.11 As mentioned above, Turkey’s foreign policy has made serious efforts in development assistance in the region, in particular, as a result of TIKA’s restructuring and the expansion of its activities.12 Turkey’s development assistance was instrumental is rebuilding Somalia’s dilapidated and war-torn infrastructure, such as rebuilding the airport in Mogadishu, paving much needed roads that now connect Mogadishu’s city center to the airport, and helping Somalia to modernize. This fosters Somalia reentry into the global world13In addition, direct flights from Istanbul to Mogadishu by Turkish Airlines have facilitated Somalia’s communication with the world.

Turkey’s Somali policy displays a multi-dimensional and also multi-actor situation when compared to the policies imple- mented by other countries.

Turkey provided Somalia with essential infrastructure projects. Turkey built field hospitals, giving doctors the much-needed medical infrastructure to care for approximately one 1,200 patients daily. Also, a hospital with a 200-bed ca- pacity was opened. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) cooperated with the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) to drill wells, providing for the water needs of one hundred and twenty six thousand people, in a country struggling with drought. And an Agricultural School was opened in Somalia to educate Somalis on how to prevent drought and foster awareness of the richness of their land.

Turkey also helped to build a Fisheries Training School in Somalia. The for- mer Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ attended the inauguration to lay the

11. Hakan Fidan and Rahman Nurdun, "Turkey’s Role in the Global Development Assistance Community: The Case of TIKA”, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol 10, No 1, 2008, pp. 93-111; Abdirahman Ali, "Turkey’s Foray into Africa: A New Humanitarian Power?”, Insight Turkey, Vol 13, No 4, 2011, pp. 65-73.

12. For a wider discussion on the issue see, Cemalettin Haşimi, "Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy and Devel- opment Cooperation,” Insight Turkey, Vol 16, No 1, 2014, pp. 127-145; Mehmet Ozkan, "Does "Rising Power” Mean "Rising Donor”? Turkey’s Development Aid in Africa”, Africa Review, Vol 5, No 2, 2013, pp. 139-147.

13. See Oktay Bingöl, "Somali’de Barış ve Kalkınma Sürecinde Türkiye’nin Rolü,” Akademik Bakış, Vol 7 No 13, Winter 2013, pp. 81-106.

TURKEY’S SOMALIA POLICY

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TURKEY’S INVOLVEMENT IN SOMALIA: ASSESMENT OF A STATE-BUILDING IN PROGRESS

foundation for the school. Although Somalia has Africa’s longest ocean strip, its ongoing civil war, which has lasted for almost a quarter of a century, put an end to fishing on one of the world’s most beautiful coastlines. Teaching the Somalis how to fish again through this will be a lasting investment in the economic sustainabil- ity of the country by creating employment, restarting a valuable food sector, and even developing a fisheries industry.14

All of these projects fit into a more long-term development assistance plan. However, the main obstacle confronting Turkey’s success in developmental assis- tance remains the issue of security. In a country where chronic security problems persists, the population generally migrates away from the rural areas, where agri- cultural is produced towards the cities or areas where there is relatively more secu- rity. If security can be re-established on the coast and in the agricultural areas, the development assistance efforts undertaken by Turkey can have a lasting impact.

STATE-BUILDING

It would not be an overstatement to say that the official government and aid orga- nizations in Turkey are working together to re-build Somalia.15 If the experience in the Republic of Northern Cyprus is taken as an example then state building was never at the core of Turkish foreign policy. This kind of policy requires a very comprehensive approach and a deep knowledge about the country under question. In considering how Western countries participated in state-building in the post-colonial period, Turkey has played a more "passive” role throughout this process of state-building in Somalia. The tactic chosen by Turkey has been to put forward local Somali actors and strengthen them while supporting vari- ous projects relating to emergency aid and developmental assistance. Although the Turkish authorities do not officially use a "state-building discourse,” Somali actors’ ability to make their own decisions and to establish a mechanism that can allow them to stand on their own two-feet is equivalent to state-building. Turkey has supported the establishment of some government-supported organizations and institutions, as well as some projects in various countries such as Afghani- stan, Palestine, Tunisia, and Libya. However, the experience in Somalia is different compared to these previous ones, as everything has to be rebuilt from the scratch.

14. http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_turkiye-somaliye-balik-tutmayi-ogretecek_2057441.html (10 Novem- ber 2013).

15. Mensur Akgün, "Somali’de yeni bir devlet inşa ediyoruz,” Star, 22 December 2012.24

Moreover,