

SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE PURSUANT
TO RESOLUTIONS 751 (1992) AND 1907 (2009)
CONCERNING SOMALIA AND ERITREA

S/AC.29/2014/COMM.15
7 February 2014
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Letter dated 6 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Somali Republic
to the United Nations addressed to President of the Security Council and copied the Chair of
the Committee

Excellency,

I have the honour to forward herewith a letter REF: NSA/SP/028/014, dated 06 February 2014, from the Office of the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, in Pursuant to Resolution 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013).

Excellency, I would highly appreciate if the content of the letter be circulated to the members of the United Nations Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,



Dr. Elmi Ahmed Duale
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka
Soomaaliya

Xafiiska Madaxweynaha

La-taliyaha Madaxweynaha
ee Amniga Qaranka



Federal Republic of
Somalia

Office of the President

National Security Adviser
to the Somali President

Ref: NSA/SP/028/014

Mogadishu, February 6th, 2014

Subject: Final FGS Report on Arms Embargo

To: HE Joon Oh, Chairman, Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea,
United Nations, New York

**Report of the Federal Government of Somalia
to**

The United Nations Security Council

Pursuant to Resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013)

INTRODUCTION

Paragraph 9 of UN Security Council Resolution 2111 (2013) states:

Reminds the Federal Government of Somalia of its obligations to report to the Security Council no later than 6 October 2013, following that by 6 February 2014, and every six months thereafter, on:

- a) The structure of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia;
- b) The infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of military equipment by the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia;
- c) The procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use and storage of weapons by the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and on training needs in this regard;"

The Federal Government of Somalia has complied with all reporting obligations under Security Council Resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013), having submitted reports to the Security Council dated 18 March 2013 and 6 October 2013. The present report fulfills the obligation of the

Federal Government of Somalia, pursuant to Paragraph 9 of Security Council Resolution 2111 (2013), to submit a report to the Security Council by 6 February 2014.

In addition to these bi-annual reports, the Federal Government of Somalia has submitted three advance notifications of imports – and one notification of delivery – of arms and ammunition intended solely for the development of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia and to provide security for the Somali people. The advance notifications of imports were dated 1 July 2013, 23 July 2013 and 12 August 2013. The notification of delivery was dated 9 July 2014.

The FGS also endeavors to engage in a number of international processes that aim to enhance arms and ammunition management in accordance with international standards (see Annex 17)

The structure of the present report reflects the specific reporting requirements set out in Resolution 2111 (see above):

- Part 1: Provides additional and updated information on the structure of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia.
- Part 2: Situation Al-Shabab's intent, capacity & capability.
- Part 3: Arms and ammunition storage facilities and procedures Halane Camp storage facility.
- Part 4: Provides additional and updated information on the procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use and storage of weapons by the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and training needs in this regard.

PART 1: Structure of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia

Introduction

In an earlier letter addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 18 March 2013, the Minister of Defense of the Federal Government of Somalia, H.E. Abdihakim Mohamoud Faqi, reported on the structure of the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, comprising an organigram of the Somali Armed Forces Command and a map indicating Armed Forces Sector Headquarters.

In addition, in a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea dated 6 October 2013, the Somali National Security Adviser, Abdirahman Sheikh Issa, provided additional information regarding the creation by the Federal Government of Somalia of a National Security Council, as well as information on the structure of the Council; and the location of the Somali National Army (SNA) in the four military sectors established under the AMISOM Concept of Operations.

There follows additional and updated information on the structure of the Somali security forces, including the Somali Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force), the Somali Police Force (SPF), the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and the Custodial Corps.

STRUCTURES OF SOMALI SECURITY FORCES

Somali Security Forces continue to rebuild its security sector, despite a very complex security environment that includes ongoing operations against Al-Shabab. The Somali Security Forces ultimate objective is to establish small but professional military that is affordable and sustainable in the long term for the Somali State revenues, and which is able to take on the responsibility for the provision a safe and secure environment when AMISOM Forces leave the country.

The structure of the Somali Security Forces is progressing and the central chain of command and control is functional though still is incomplete. However, our security forces and particularly the Somali National Army (SNA) are moving towards a more unified structure.

The SNA structure is based primarily upon battalions, with brigades and sectors headquarters and additional support training elements constituted under the order of battle. The main two training camps, which are part of the support elements, are mainly based in Mogadishu area consists of: (a) Camp Jazzer 1, which is already functioning and (b) Camp Jazzer 2, whose construction is still in the process of completion.

Notwithstanding the existence of various line ministries, who are respectively in charge of the technical administration of SNA, Police and NISA, and the Custodial Corp, yet there is still the NSC, who is the second layer, as well as, the highest institution of the civilian leadership and democratic oversight for the security sector. Hence, it is at the NSC, which encompasses the key personalities and institutions, including the President, Prime Minister and other key government ministers, such as, Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, National Security, Justice and Finance, that is provided the highest strategic decisions on matters of security. In fact, it is the NSC that will lead the effort to develop and prioritize all security policies that will be reflected in an integrated National Security Strategy. The NSC is supported by a secretariat, led by the National Security Adviser of the President, whose role is to ensure close coordination between all government departments that contribute to national security.

The Federal Government Somalia will adopt the human rights road map and has appointed a new Minister for Human Rights.

The Minister of Defence has recently introduced a Code of Conduct that outlines the discipline the behavior of all military members. The Chief of Defence Staff of the SNA has already issued in 2011 "Order #1" that prohibits recruitment of Child Soldiers. The Code of Conduct and Order #1 are both applied rigorously within all units of Defense Forces.

The structure of the security forces are listed below and its detailed information are found on the following attachments:

Attachment 01 # NSC - National Security Council Structure

Attachment 02 # SNA Arms Control Structure

Attachment 03 # SNA Chain of Command

Attachment 04 # SNA General Structure

Attachment 05 # SNA Structure – Sector 12 (AMISOM Sector 1 & 5)

Attachment 06 # SNA Structure – Sector 21 (AMISOM Sector 4)

Attachment 07 # SNA Structure – Sector 43 (AMISOM Sector 2 & Kismayo)

Attachment 08 # SNA Structure – Sector 60 (AMISOM Sector 3)

Attachment 09 # SNA Medical Structure

Attachment 10 # SNA Training Structure

Attachment 11 # POLICE Structure

Attachment 12 # PRISONS FORCE Structure & Function

Attachment 13 # NISA Structure

PART 2: SITUATION AL-SHABAB'S INTENT, CAPACITY & CAPABILITY

Al-Shabaab's intent to undermine the FGS and its allies and to control Somalia as an Islamist movement remains unchanged. It pursues both a national and a regional agenda and remains part of the wider Al-Qaeda network. The group's internal strife during 2013 has been the worst in several years and its leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, continues to face opposition from some colleagues. However, while the in-fighting almost certainly contributed to a slowdown of Al-Shabaab operations in some parts of Somalia during the summer of 2013, Godane's disposal of some of his enemies and the withdrawal into hiding of others resulted in an even greater consolidation of authority in Godane than before. The tightening of Godane's control over Al-Shabaab troops, particularly Amniyat (security) agents makes it even easier for Godane to issue unilateral commands for actions against internal and external enemies alike. Consequently, while al-Shabaab's in-fighting has weakened the insurgency in some aspects, it has strengthened Godane's capability and doubtless his intent to assert his authority by ordering high-profile attacks.


Gauging the number of Al-Shabaab troops is always difficult, given the insurgents' mobility, the undercover nature of some members, and the continual recruitment albeit often of children and ageing men unsuited to warfare. Nonetheless, Al-Shabaab probably comprises 4,000-5,000 troops and Amniyat members. Recruits include foreign fighters alongside locally-born Somalis, and financial and technical assistance also continues to be provided from outside Somalia. The slowdown in operations in 2013 by pro-FGS troops gave Al-Shabaab the opportunity to reorganize and restructure; similarly, the unsuccessful raid by US Navy SEALs against Al-Shabaab-held Barawe in early October caused the insurgents to re-evaluate having much of their command located in the port town. Consequently, although Barawe continues to be occupied by Al-Shabaab and remains a strategically important port, both for supplies and tax revenue purposes, many Al-Shabaab members previously located there have been dispersed to other locations. Currently, the three main bases for Al-Shabaab are near Buloburto (Hiran), Dinsor (Bay), and Jilib (Middle Juba), though the insurgents are careful to avoid large groupings inside these three towns to limit the effects of any possible strikes against them. Al-Shabaab also continues to be present openly in smaller numbers in many other towns, such as Ceel Buur (Galgadud), Jalalaqsi (Hiran) and Xudur (Bakool), and its members also continue to move freely across much of rural south-central Somalia.

Covert insurgents, particularly Amniyat agents, are located in all the main towns and cities held by pro-FGS forces, with several hundred estimated to be in Mogadishu. A few hundred insurgents are also located in the Galgala mountains in northern Puntland, but they have kept a fairly low profile during 2013 and seem focused on keeping open the logistics route running through Puntland down to south-central Somalia. Key training camps are located at Yaaq Braawe (near Dinsor) and Buqda (near Buloburto).

As can be seen from the map below, pro-FGS forces control most of the main cities and towns in south-central Somalia, but Al-Shabaab continues to dominate many of the rural areas. The fight to control Somalia consists of a mixture of conventional military actions (mainly assayed by pro-FGS forces) and terrorist actions (solely by Al-Shabaab), resulting in non-contiguous and non-linear areas of operations. The insurgents have an array of weapons (including AK-47s, PKMs, RPGs, mortars, and hand grenades) and vehicles (including pick-up trucks mounted with anti-aircraft machine-guns).

However, they are weak militarily and have little capacity to undertake any significant military actions, instead focusing on minor hit-and-run attacks and ambushes. Consequently, their ability to defend strategic locations such as Barawe or Bulo Burto is questionable. However, an important caveat to this is that the very importance of these few significant locations still held by the insurgents may force Al-Shabaab to undertake more forceful defenses of them than they undertook of, say, Kismayo last year or Mahaday more recently.

What is clear is that Al-Shabaab instead continues to focus on terrorist warfare, particularly suicide and complex attacks, IED attacks, and targeted killings, as a way of destabilizing pro-FGS areas. The use of terrorism also allows Al-Shabaab to select soft high-value targets, thereby intimidating locals and undermining local and international confidence in Somalia and its government. It is almost inevitable that once pro-FGS forces take over al-Shabaab's remaining few key locations, said locations will become the subject of such terrorist attacks. However, as pro-FGS troops gain control of the few significant locations currently under Al-Shabaab control, the insurgents are likely to become overstretched and to suffer a reduction in materiel, so their capacity to undertake continuous high-level attacks across south-central Somalia will be doubtful.



PART 3: ARMS AND AMMUNITION STORAGE FACILITIES AND PROCEDURES

HALANE CAMP STORAGE FACILITY

The Somali Defense Forces have a limited ammunition and weapons storage capacity due to the long lasting conflict. However, since the advent of the new government, the SFG is putting a particular effort in the rehabilitation and the building of armories and ammunition depots that meet the internationally set criteria, with the assistance of partners.

All previously used ammunition and weapons storage facilities in Villa Baidoa and Villa Somalia have been closed. Their contents, together with the weapons and ammunition received during the past year under the partial lifting of the arms embargo and after notifications to the UNSC in terms of resolution 2093 (2013) have been moved to the new facility constructed within the confines of AMISOM Airport base.

In the future are being planned:

- Halane camp ammunition depot underground (40m x 30m).
- Five battalion size armory (Villa Gashandiga, Villa Somalia, Villa Baidoa, Jazeera One, and Sector 12 HQ) (each will be 22m x 11m).

The Halane armoury has been built to meet basic security requirements:

Security

- Two layers of walls are erected.
- The roof of the armoury has been filled with sand bags to protect against indirect fire effects.
- The gates are closed and a guard system is in place at all times.
- Inside, the corridors are set and the separation between the different types of ammunitions achieved.
- At all time, the store-men are alone in the armoury and the authorized arms and ammunitions recipients stay outside of the main building.

Safety

- While waiting for the fire extinguisher promised by UNSOA, sand buckets are in place.
- The premise is a non-smoking area and the marks are made visible as well as the signs "Danger".

Management and Administration


An expert in weapons and ammunitions is in place to look at the procedures for delivery of ammunitions or weapons to the units after the necessary documents are signed and the proper authorizations from the Chief of Defence Forces, the unit's Sector commander, the chief of the Intelligence department, the Chief of the Logistics Department and the store security officer are put on the request paper.


Only formed units receive weapons and ammunitions and they have a unit logbook where their personnel are listed with their weapons.

The armory keepers have log books, for reception, movements in and out, date, beneficiaries and positions.

All the weapons and ammunitions are marked visibly and by categories.

Formal and random visits are done by the CDF, the Intelligence officer, the logistic officer, every time with the head of weapons and ammunitions department.





WEAPONS MANAGEMENT AND ARMOURY CONTROL PROCEDURES

Weapon management and armory control of the Somali security forces is based on layered security system that relies on techniques and procedures of interlocking checks and balances, each of which is recorded in an accountable document.

These accountable documents consist of folios, books, registers or cards that are required to be kept and produced for inspection by higher commanders and armours. Together this set of document provides proof of weapon ownership and management.

Therefore, the system is transparent and verifiable and relies on the following steps:

- Step 1 Weapons Registration: The weapons register is the master document linking a weapon to an individual.
- Step 2 Weapons Cards: Weapons cards are receipts for weapons in safekeeping.
- Step 3 Regular Armory Inspections: Regular, independent, armory inspections (From DCOS/J4/ Weapon and Ammunition Department).

Step 1: Weapons Registration

The weapons Registrations accurately recorded and certified by the commander of the unit and are kept up to date. A sample page contains these details:

- Weapon Type.
- Weapon Serial Number.
- Name of the Owner.
- Owner's Signature.
- Butt Number.
- Date of Entry.
- Commander's signature confirming that the details are correct.

Step 2 Weapons Cards

Weapons cards are receipts for weapons in safekeeping. A weapons card is an accountable document in the possession of the individual. The weapons card bears the name of the individual, his signature, a description of the type and serial number of the weapon and its butt number. The weapons' butt number identifies which particular space in the armory is allocated to that weapon.

Step 3 Regular Armory Inspections

Regular and/or independent armory inspections are done sometimes without notice. This provides commanders, individuals, armourers and other interested third parties with the assurance that the armory is being properly managed and that a degree of weapons control and management exists. The inspector collects a set of inspection sheets from the armourer and consults the latest version of the weapons register. This tells him how many weapons should be in the armory. He can then check that for each weapon either a weapon or weapons card is present. More thorough inspections may involve checking a sample of the weapons serial numbers to ensure that all entries in the weapons register are correct.

ARMOURY PROCEDURES & WEAPONS MANAGEMENT

Armories: An armory is a secure store for weapons. The security of an armory is achieved through the following layered security system.

1. First, the armory is sited within a secure area; the external door is secured with a security lock and windows are barred. Only authorized personnel should have access to the armory keys.
2. Second, layer of security is achieved through key control. Only authorized personnel should have access to the armory keys.
3. Third, security is guaranteed from access control. Hence, only legitimate personnel, only one at a time, are allowed to enter the armory.
4. Fourth, weapons are being kept to their racks by means of a chain and padlocks. No weapon will be issued without the specific authorization of the person in charge.
5. Fifth, only unloaded weapons are allowed into and out of the armory. Hence, the weapons being stored may not be used to threaten the armourer.
6. The armourer will keep up to date firearms inventory records and with all rules and regulation concerning firearms as mandated by the Somali National Army.

Weapons Racks: Weapons racks are wooden or metal racks that allow the weapons to be secured so that an individual weapon cannot be removed unless unlocked by the armourer. The rack has spaces for individual weapons. If a weapon is not present, then its corresponding weapons card should be indicating that the legitimate user has possession of it for official purposes.

Receiving Procedure: Only unloaded weapons are allowed in the armoury; hence an unloading area or bay should be sited close to the armoury's entrance. On presenting his weapon to the armourer, the soldier proves that it is unloaded by "showing clear".

Unloading the Weapon: The magazine is removed from the weapon and the working parts operated a minimum of three times.

Showing Clear: The working parts of the weapon (the action) are pulled and held to the rear, exposing the chamber to the armourer. On assuring himself that the weapon is unloaded he verbally acknowledges this with the word "CLEAR" (or the Somali equivalent).

The armourer then takes possession of the weapon and after checking its butt number, places it in its designated rack location. As he does this, he takes the weapons card and hands it to the weapon's use.

Issuing Procedure: If an individual approaches the armory and enters the access cage, he first hands his weapons card to the armourer. Consequently, the armourer checks the butt number and goes to that rack space. He selects the weapon and hangs the weapons card in its place; the weapon is then taken to the individual and the armourer pulls the working parts to the rear. The individual then takes charge of the weapon and leaves the armory.

Armory Facility: If no building is available, it is sometimes possible to set up an armory inside a shipping container. The container to be converted into armory, it requires to be fully equipping with guns racks, a hatch for issuing weapons, and it also requires ventilation. A container armory is probably the fastest and most cost effective way to get an armory operational - enabling the safe storage weapons and small arms ammunition.

AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT STORAGE AND PROCEDURES

This ammunition depot responds to a thorough storage and safety procedures that takes into account the consequential hazard and risk assessment for the storage of ammunition.

Ammunition storage:

Hazard Classification Codes

The system consists of 9 dangerous goods classifications of which Class 1 comprises ammunition and explosives. Class 1 is subdivided into Hazard Divisions, which indicate the type of hazard to be expected in the event of an accident involving a quantity of ammunition. Class 1 ammunition is further divided into Compatibility Groups designed to minimize the risk of storing items together that will either increase the risk of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an accident. This process does not take into account the probability of an incident. It assumes that if it can happen it will, and when it does, it identifies the extent of the hazards.

The UN Hazard Classification Code (HCC) for an explosive or type of ammunition shall therefore consist of a combination of:


- a) The Hazard Division and
- b) The Compatibility Group.

Hazard Divisions


The Hazard Division for a particular explosive or type of ammunition, within Hazard Class 1 of the GHS (Globally Harmonized System), shall be determined by its performance and test results according to Part I of the Manual of Tests and Criteria of the UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods.

Stockpile management organizations should ensure that the ammunition and explosives in their possession is classified in accordance with the GHS. Table 1 summarizes the Hazard Divisions that should be adopted during the stockpile management of conventional ammunition, although alternative local systems may be utilized.


Class 1 is divided into 4 main divisions




Mass explosion



Mass Fragmentation



Massfire



Moderate fire

Fire Hazard Symbol 1 (Mass Explosion)

Fire Hazard Symbols 1 (Haz Division 1.1) comprises substance that has a mass explosion hazard.

Hazards of this division are blast, high velocity projections, and other projections of relatively low velocity.

Explosions result in severe structural damage—the severity and range determined by the amount of explosives involved. There may also be a risk from heavy debris propelled from the structure in which the explosion occurs or from the crater.

SNA munitions falling into this category:

Grenades (HE),

Rocket warheads (HE, HEAT), PG7

Boosters, fuzes (some 1.2)

Fire Hazard Symbol 2 (Fragmentation)

Fire Hazard Symbol 2 (Hazard Division 1.2) comprises substances that have a projection hazard but not a Mass Explosion hazard. An explosion that occurs with items of this category results in items burning and exploding progressively, a few at a time.

Furthermore, fragments, firebrands (piece of burning wood), and unexploded items may be projected in considerable numbers. Some of these may explode on impact and may cause fires or explosions. Blast effects are minor in comparison to Hazard Division 1.1 and are limited to the immediate vicinity.

SNA munitions falling into this category:

Some fuzes

Fire Hazard Symbols 3 (Mass Fire)

Fire Hazard Symbols 3 (Hazard Division 1.3) comprises substance that have: a fire hazard, either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both - but not a mass explosion hazard.

This division includes some items that burn with great violence and intense heat emitting considerable thermal radiation (mass fire hazard) and others that burn sporadically. Items in this division may explode but do not usually produce "dangerous" fragments. Firebrands (pieces of burning wood) and burning containers may be projected.

SNA munitions falling into this category:

Ammunition Smokes,

Ammunition illuminating,

Propellant charges

Fire hazard symbol 4 (Moderate Fire)

Fire Hazard Symbol 4 (Hazard Division 1.4) includes items that present no significant hazards—items with primarily a moderate fire hazard. They do not contribute excessively to a fire.

The effects are largely confined to the package. No fragments of appreciable size or range are to be expected. An external fire does not cause the simultaneous explosion of the total contents of a package of such items.

SNA munitions falling into this category:

Small arms:

- 9mm
- 7,62mm
- Time fuzes

Compatibility Groups

There may be hundreds of thousands of individual ammunition items, of many different types, stored in a single stockpile. The different types of ammunition will vary in purpose, calibre, explosive type and manufacturer, all with varying degrees of volatility. In order to improve overall safety by reducing the probability of an accident or the magnitude of an accident that may occur, each specific type of conventional ammunition should be allocated to Compatibility Group. Strict application of the Mixing Rules will then ensure a significant reduction in risk.

Compatibility Group	Short description	Exemples
A	Primary explosive substance.	Examples are lead azide, lead styphnate, mercury fulminate, tetracene, dry RDX, and dry PETN.
B	Articles containing a primary explosive substance and not containing two or more effective protective features.	Examples are detonators, blasting caps, small arms primers, and fuzes without two or more safety features. Some articles, such as detonators for blasting, detonator assemblies for blasting and primers, cap-type, are included, even though they do not contain primary explosives.

C	Propellant explosive substance or other deflagrating explosive substance or article containing such explosive substance.	Examples are single-, double-, triple-based, and composite propellants, rocket motors (solid propellant), and ammunition with inert projectile.
D	Secondary detonating article containing a secondary detonating explosive substance without means of initiation and without a propelling charge.	Examples are bulk TNT, Composition B, wet RDX, bombs, projectiles, warheads, or fuzes with two or more safety features.
E	Article containing a secondary detonating explosive substance without means of initiation, with propelling charge.	Examples are artillery ammunition, rockets, or guided missiles.
F	Article containing a secondary detonating explosive substance with its own means of initiation, with propelling charge.	An example is a rocket propelled grenade.
G	Pyrotechnic substance, or article containing a pyrotechnic substance, or article. Article containing both explosive substance and white phosphorus.	Examples are flares, signals, incendiary or illuminating ammunition, and other smoke and tear producing devices.
H	Article containing both explosive substance and white phosphorus.	Examples are WP, plasticized white phosphorus (PWP), or other ammunition containing pyrophoric material.
J	Ammunition containing both explosives and flammable liquids or gels.	Examples include liquid or gel-filled incendiary ammunition.
K	Articles containing both an explosive substance and a toxic chemical agent.	Examples are artillery or mortar ammunition (fuzed or unfuzed), grenades, and rockets or bombs filled with a lethal or incapacitating chemical agent.
L	Explosive substance or article containing an explosive substance and presenting a special risk needing isolation of each type.	Examples are pre-packaged hypergolic liquid- fueled rocket engines, TPA (thickened TEA), and damaged or suspect ammunition of any group.

N	Hazard Division 1.6 ammunition containing only extremely insensitive detonating substance (EIDS).	Examples are bombs and warheads. If dissimilar Group N munitions, such as Mk 82 and Mk 84 Bombs, are mixed together and have not been tested to assure non- propagation: the mixed munitions are considered to be Hazard Division 1.2. Compatibility Group D for purposes of transportation and storage.
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Storage of Compatibility Groups

Mixing rules

Ideally a higher degree of safety may be achieved by storing every ammunition type separately, but this is usually not practicable for reasons of storage capacity. Ammunition of different Compatibility Groups may be stored together in order to maximize the efficient use of available storage space. Conventional ammunition should be stored by Compatibility Group in accordance with the mixing rules illustrated in table below.

Compatibility

Compatibility Group	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	J	K	L	N	S
A													
B													
C													
D													
E													
F													
G													
H													
J													
K													
L													
N													
S													

Due to the complexity of the system, further explanation may be necessary as well as a technical assistance while the depot is constructed. This table is extracted from the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG 01.50 2nd Edition (2012-09-01)) which is the document used for all Physical Security Stockpile Management throughout the world at present.

Ammunition requiring separate storage

In addition to the mixing rules certain types of conventional ammunition should always be stored separately, (or under specific conditions), from other types of ammunition:

- a) Detonators and blasting caps, (separated from Compatibility Groups C, D, E, and F by a dividing wall capable of preventing sympathetic detonation of other items);
- b) White phosphorous;
- c) Damaged ammunition. (If considered unsafe for storage, damaged munitions should be destroyed at the earliest convenience);
- d) Ammunition in an unknown condition. (This shall be stored at such a distance that detonation of this ammunition will not jeopardize other stocks);
- e) Ammunition that has deteriorated and become hazardous. (This shall be stored in isolation and destroyed at the earliest convenience); and
- f) Pyrotechnics and propellants.

Storage and Stacking

Each stack of ammunition should be stable and consist of the same ammunition type (and preferably of the same lot or batch). All stacks should have a tally card recording the receipt and issue of ammunition, as well as an ammunition register for accounting purposes. Each stack must not exceed 1.20m high.

Although the ammunition stored should be compatible, it is recommended to physically separate the sensitive items like fuses from the rest of the ammunition wherever possible. Sand bag wall 1m high could also be placed in between piles of items to minimize the blast effect that may propagate a sympathetic explosion. If this is not possible because of limited space then internal divisions and separate shelving should be erected.

PART 4: PROCEDURES AND CODES OF CONDUCT IN PLACE FOR THE REGISTRATION, DISTRIBUTION, USE AND STORAGE OF WEAPONS BY THE SECURITY FORCES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA, AND TRAINING NEEDS IN THIS REGARD

Introduction

As has been expressed consistently in our reports to the Security Council, the Federal Government of Somalia remains committed in observing all international norms and standards in weapon control and management.

Wherever possible, and to the extent that the extremely difficult security situation in Somalia will allow, the Federal Government of Somalia and our implementing partners strive to comply with the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) developed by the United Nations.

The Federal Government of Somalia has taken a number of concrete initiatives to strengthen and improve the procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use and storage of weapons by our Security Forces. These are set out below.

Somali Explosives Management Authority (SEMA)

The Federal Government of Somalia has formed the Somali Explosives Management Authority (SEMA) by Presidential Decree effective 6 August 2013. SEMA is the national body responsible for the safe and secure storage of ammunition, explosives and weapons.

Under the auspices of the Ministry of National Security, SEMA is also responsible for all components of mine action policy as well as follow up on the implementation of obligations of the Federal Government under the Cluster Munitions and Ottawa Conventions, and other relevant treaties on disarmament ratified by the Federal Government.

For the structure of SEMA see attachment #2

Identification of Key Elements of Arms and Ammunition Management

The Federal Government of Somalia, with support from our partners, has identified the following five elements as key to the control and management of arms and ammunition in Somalia, based on the 2004 *Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States*:

- a) Arms control and stockpile management.
- b) Import, export and transit of arms and ammunition.
- c) Tracking and brokering of arms and ammunition.
- d) Public awareness and education and
- e) Legislative measures.

Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group (WAMTWG)

In order to address key issues related to the control and management of arms and ammunition in Somalia, the Federal Government of Somalia, together with the United Nations and other partners, has created a Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group (WAMTWG). The Technical Working Group is primarily concerned with arms control and stockpile management (point an above), as well as aspects of public awareness and education (point an above).

The Technical Working Group is co-chaired by the Federal Government of Somalia (at the level of Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Security) and by the United Nations (represented by the UN Mine Action Service). The Federal Government of Somalia is further represented on the Technical Working Group by the Ministry of Defence, the Somali Armed Forces, the Somali Police Force, the National Intelligence and Security Agency, the Custodial Corps and the Somali Explosives Management Authority (SEMA).

Additional members of the Technical Working Group include the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Somalia-Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the European Union (EU), the Governments of Turkey, UK and USA, as well as implementing partners — Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Norwegian People's Aid, Foundation Suisse de Deminage, Bancroft Global Development and other coopted members as needed.

The role of the Technical Working Group is to assist the Federal Government of Somalia to mobilize and coordinate the resources that will enable us to more effectively control and manage weapons and ammunition. In particular, the Technical Working Group is responsible for:

- Providing expert technical advice to the authorities of the Federal Government of Somalia on all matters relating to arms control and stockpile management, including on compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013).
- Assisting the Federal Government of Somalia to identify our key priorities and developing a Work Plan on Arms Control and Stockpile Management.
- Assisting the Federal Government of Somalia to implement the deliverables of the Work Plan.
- Assisting the Federal Government of Somalia to mobilize and coordinate support and assistance from donors and partners.
- Identifying future training requirements and coordinating the delivery of training.
- Undertaking public awareness and educational activities to improve community safety and security.
- Involving Federal Government of Somalia officials in all activities to grow and develop the Government's capacity so that the Federal Government can eventually assume total responsibility.

The Technical Working Group meets monthly and submits a report of its work to the Ministry of National Security on a monthly basis.

Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee

On 22 January 2014 the Federal Government of Somalia inaugurated an Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee. Under the auspices of the Somali National Security Council, the Steering Committee is the Federal Government of Somalia's high-level body responsible for coordinating and monitoring implementation of the requirements set forth in UN Security Council Resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013), as well as the five key elements of arms and ammunition management set out above.

The Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee is chaired by the National Security Adviser to the President of Somalia and its membership comprises representatives of the Federal Government of Somalia, the United Nations, AMISOM, regional and bi-lateral partners and technical implementing partners.

Weapons and Ammunition Management Workshop

On 21-22 January 2014, the Federal Government of Somalia — in cooperation with UNSOM, UNMAS, UNIDIR and UNDP—held an Arms and Ammunition Management Workshop in Mogadishu. The goal was to facilitate better understanding among relevant officials of the Federal Government of Somalia, AMISOM, RECSA, UNSOM, SEMG and other UN agencies assisting

the Federal Government, on priorities, challenges and opportunities relating to arms and ammunition management and monitoring in Somalia, and identification of possible measures that can be undertaken to address them.

The Federal Government of Somalia was represented in the workshop at a high level by the National Security Adviser and by senior officers of the Somali Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force), the Somali Police Force, the National Intelligence and Security Agency and the Custodial Corps.

International arms and ammunition experts presented relevant international and regional policy frameworks related to physical security and stockpile management, monitoring and management of legal imports of arms and ammunition, tracing illicit arms and ammunition, and relevant international norms and standards that can guide the Federal Government of Somalia to put in place effective controls over the full life-cycle of arms and ammunition — in particular the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG).

The workshop contributed to building the capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia in the area of arms and ammunition management and highlighted key priorities and recommendations for moving forward. A comprehensive report of the Arms and Ammunition Management Workshop is under preparation and will be finalized by early March 2014.

Training Needs

The immediate training needs of the Federal Government of Somalia as they relate to arms and ammunition management is as follows, in order of priority:

- 1. Training on risk reduction in ammunition storage sites.** The Federal Government of Somalia faces many challenges in safely and securely storing large calibre ammunition and explosives. While the Federal Government continues to expand its control over the territory of Somalia, our options with regard to the location of ammunition storage sites remains limited, with the result that some ammunition storage sites are located too close to transport routes, residential areas and other vulnerable buildings. In most cases, there is no alternative to storing ammunition where it is now.

The Somali Security Forces would benefit from advice and training on practical, low-cost measures to reduce the risk of unintended explosions at our existing ammunition storage sites.

- 2. Training on effective armory/depot physical security and stockpile management,** including for large-scale depots of arms and ammunition (e.g. held by the Somali National Army) and on smaller-scale armories (e.g. held by the Somali National Police). This should include training on physical security, safe handling, recordkeeping, weapons accounting,

issuing and receiving procedures, access control, key management and other relevant issues.

3. **Training and equipment to enable marking and recordkeeping of small arms and light weapons.** The Federal Government of Somalia needs to build our capacity to mark and record imported small arms and light weapons before they are distributed to our Security Forces. To this end, the Somali Security Services are in need of equipment and training that will allow them to apply import markings in accordance with international standards. In addition, we require training, software and equipment that will allow the Federal Government to establish a national electronic recordkeeping system for all small arms and light weapons held by the Somali Security Services.

PART 5: Summary of FGS notifications to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee

In accordance with UN resolution 2093 and 2011, the FGS to date has submitted three notifications to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee regarding the supply of weapons and ammunition. The notifications and deliveries of arms and ammunition as of 06 February 2014 are as follows (see Annex 14):

- a) On 01 July 2013 notification of 1,000 AK-47 from Uganda.
- b) On 23 July 2013 notification of arms and ammunition from Ethiopia.
- c) On 12 August 2013 notification of arms and ammunition from Djibouti.

It has come to the attention of the FGS that one additional delivery of weapons and ammunition was not notified to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee. On 03 October 2013, the FGS received a delivery of arms and ammunition from Djibouti (not notified). For contents of the delivery see packing list in Annex 16.

Furthermore, the FGS is aware that additional equipment and training support has been provided to Puntland and Somaliland without notification from member states and regional organizations. However, since the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee was notified on time, but not the FGS, we have clarified the protocol with the parties. During the Puntland Regional Presidential elections, UNSOM provided camouflage uniforms to the Puntland Security forces to meet a prior request by the Puntland authorities. Since the FGS was not informed of this request by Puntland and UNSOM, the Sanctions Committee was not notified of this provision (See Attachment 17# Ref: NSA/SP/011/014 of Jan. 06th, 2014).

Individual States and/or regional organizations such as EUCAP NESTOR are providing equipment and training to both Puntland and Somaliland. Even though the FGS supports the capacity building of these two regions, it is incumbent on member states and regional authorities to notify the FGS prior to the delivery of equipment and provision of military training.

Despite this requirement, no notifications of this kind have been forthcoming. And this is a challenge to FGS, since the UN Resolutions on Arms Embargo applies to the entire country and the responsibility for notification falls on the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). The FGS has brought this concern to EUCAP NESTOR.

CONCLUSION:

Somalia is at a crossroads, therefore, while the security forces are in continuing rebuilding, restructuring and undergoing security sector reform, our security forces are under continuous threat, and operate in a complex counterterrorism and counterinsurgency environment.

Logistical systems, command, control and communications as well as operational planning and military intelligence capabilities should be further enhanced. Additional firepower and equipment should be acquired to allow the security forces to have the required mobility and firepower, so that they can effectively overcome the threat of Al-Shabaab, and successfully fulfill their mandate. Accordingly, further easing or completely lifting the arms embargo is a necessity.

The challenge, therefore, is for the FGS to fight the scourge of Al-Shabaab, and once territory is recovered from them, the FGS will provide its citizens safety, security and the delivery of basic services. These conditions will foster sustainable social and economic development for years to come.

Concurrent with stabilization, the FGS should, in cooperation with the population, embark on a process of reconciliation and establishment of local administrations, in line with the FGS Provisional Constitution.

This year is critical, and represents a significant turning point for the fight against Al-Shabaab. As per UNSC Resolution 2124 (2013), both SNA and AMISOM should be deployed in different theatres of operation and implement a joint operation based on the new Concept of Operations (CONOPS) set forth and approved by the AU Peace and Security Council. To meet this challenge, SNA needs both lethal and non-lethal combat support. Consequently, Somalia's security forces need an immediate easing or lifting of the arms embargo.


The depletion of Al-Shabaab fighters within Somalia's theatre of operation is the utmost priority for restoring peace and security to Somalia and the Horn of Africa. The International Community is generously funding for the stabilization of Somalia, however, for Somalia to stand up on its feet it ultimately requires putting in place viable security forces that can guarantee Somalia's internal safety and security.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS COMMITTEE

1. The FGS recommends further easing the arms embargo to enable FGS security forces to combat the threat of Al Shabaab and provide security for the Somali people. This includes, but is not limited to; allowing the supply of weapons currently listed in the Annex to resolution 2093, in particular weapons such as recoilless guns and howitzers exceeding 12.7 mm caliber as well as 120 mm mortars. In addition, the FGS requires armoured vehicles, which allow for secure movement and mobility.
2. The FGS requests additional support, in particular for SNA Sector 1 (Banadir region), from the international community to enhance its weapons and ammunition management capabilities, including the construction of safe storage facilities and armouries, marking and record keeping.
3. Ensure that member states and regional organizations notify the FGS of any deliveries of weapons or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training, intended solely for the development of the of the Security Forces of the FGS.
4. During an arms and ammunition management workshop hosted by UNSOM in January 2014, the FGS's National Security Advisor, Mr. Abdirahman Sheikh Issa held a side meeting with Mr. Jarat Chopra and Mr. Dinesh Mahtani of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group. The National Security Advisor stressed the need for the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee to provide feedback on the government's reporting to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee in order to know eventual concerns, if any, so that FGS can comply fully with resolutions 2093 and 2011.
5. The FGS requests further support from UNSOM to provide and coordinate assistance and capacity building in arms and ammunition management and security sector reform.

Abdirahman Sheikh Issa

National Security Adviser to the President



Attached # 18
Notification Letter

Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka
Soomaaliya

Xafiiska Madaxweynaha

La-taliyaha Madaxweynaha
ee Amniga Qaranka



Federal Republic of
Somalia

Office of the President

National Security Adviser
to the Somali President

Ref: NSA/SP/011/014

Mogadishu, January 6th, 2014

Subject: Notification Letter

To: Waldemar Vrey
Director - Rule of Law and Security Institutions Group
UN Assistance Mission in Somalia

This letter is to advise you that recently it has come to our attention that UNSOM has delivered to Puntland security forces some military provision in the form uniform.

As you know, pursuant to paragraphs 33 and 38 of UN Security Council Resolution 2093 (2013), the FGS has the obligation to notify to the UN Security Council's Sanction Committee, at least five days prior to the delivery, any weapons, military equipment or provision of assistance intended to Somalia's security forces. Accordingly, the FGS in order to fulfill these requirements expects that any member state or organization shall, as well, inform in advance the FGS.

Since my office is the focal point for this matter, we are concerned that UNSOM did not notify to us. Therefore, we kindly request you to clarify the reason, if any, and eventually to redirect the matter by informing, both the FGS and the UN Sanction Committee, the quantity and description of material delivered to Puntland Security Forces, this will enable us to notify to UNSC Sanction Committee and to duly register them on our.

As we are approaching a New Year, it is critical that we establish a closer coordination.

I would like to take this opportunity to convey to you my best regards and looking forward for a closer cooperation.

Abdirahman Sheikh Issa


Federal Republic of Somalia
Office of National Security Adviser
Mogadishu - Somalia

National Security Adviser to the President

Cc: Nicholas Kay, SRSG, email:


Attachment # 01

National Security Council Structure [As of 5th February 2014]



Attachment # 02

SNA Arms Control Structure [As of 5th February 2014]



[1] Halane Camp ammunition depot in use is 20 by 20, planned underground 40 by 30


[2] W&A Div. in charge of offloading. After the reception a commission comprising the commanders or delegates of the different security forces have received the loads. The transport to the depot is a responsibility of the SNAF commander who will make sure that the military Police and the Intelligence Department are part of the escort.

[3] Batt. Armouries planned. Types are 11 by 5.5 and 22 by 11


[4] SEMA: Somali Explosive Management Authority, under control of DCOS Support an interdepartmental level function, led by an authority appointed by the President, who coordinates the work of experts from different branches (SPF, NISA, SNAF, Fire Department...)


Attachment # 03

SNA Chain of Command [As of 5th February 2014]



Attachment # 04
SNA General Structure [As of 5th Feb 2014]



SNA Structure - Sector 12 (AMISOM Sector 1) [As of 5th February 2014]

Attachment # 06
SNA Structure – Sector 21 (AMISOM Sector 4) [As of 5th February 2014]

×

11th Brigade
(700 men)
HQ: Dhusa-mareeb
Lt. Col. Abdiqani Adan
Abdulle

||

Batt. 43
"Hubaal"
(300 men)
HQ: Dhusa-mareeb
Maj. Hassan Dini
Hassan

||

Batt. 44
"Gurmad"
(300 men)
HQ Gura Ceel
Maj. Mursal
Mohamed Haifow

×

10th Brigade
(973 men)
HQ: Balad-weyne
Col. Tawane Ahmed
Mohamed

||


Batt. 39
"Gor-Gor"
(459 men)
HQ: Balad-weyne
Maj. Abdullahi Bare
Elmi

||

Batt. 40
"Duubane"
(319 men)
HQ: Kab-xanley
Col. Isaq Osman
Idiris

Attachment # 07

SNA Structure – Sector 43 (AMISOM Sector 2) [As of 5th February 2014]



[1] Under construction

Attachment # 08

SNA Structure - Sector 60 (AMISOM Sector 3) [As of 5th February 2014]

×

7th Brigade
(1568 men)

HQ: Baidoa
Col. Abdirahman Molim
Ahmed

||

Batt. 45
"Himilo"
(670 men)
HQ: Baidoa
Col. Hassan Isaq
Omar

||

Batt. 46
"Guul-wade "
(??? men)
HQ: Day-nuunay
Maj. Mohamed
Mohamud Nur

||

Batt. 47
"Sooma-jeeste "
(??? men)
HQ: Bur-hakaba
Cap. Hassan And
Yarow

×

8th Brigade
(678 men)

HQ: El Berde
Col. Ibrahim Abdi Adan

||

Batt. 41
"Galbeed "
(350 men)
HQ: El Berde
Cap. Axmed Xiish
Cartan

||

Batt. 42
"Dacaad "
(300 men)
HQ: El Berde
Maj. Hassan
Mohamed Guhad

×

9th Brigade
(1496 men)

HQ: Garbaharey
Col. Ismaail Jama Mohamed

||

Batt. 48
"Dhiirane "
(450 men)
HQ: Luuq
Cap. Ahmed Xis
Artan


||

Batt. 49
"Cadow Jebse "
(??? men)
HQ: Ceel Waaq
Cap. Abdullahi Sirad
Farah



||

Batt. 50
"Aamusane "
(??? men)
HQ: Garbaharey
Cap. Abdirahman
Ibrahim Moahamed

Attachment # 09
SNA Medical Structure [As of 1st February 2014]




Attachment # 10
SNA Training Structure [As of 5th February 2014]




Attachment # 11

POLICE Structure [As of 5th February 2014]




Attachment # 12

PRISONS Force Structure & Functions [As of 5th February 2014]



5 functions



Weapons [3] = x80 guns AK 47


- Central prisons = 33 guns
- Head Quarters = 16 guns
- Squad working with the judiciary = 16 guns
- Afgoye District Prison = 11 guns
- Marka District Prison = 4 guns

[1] Note: the qualities of the armies written are not useful because of the most of them are old armies and accumulated already.

[2] Prisons for agricultural sector

[3] Those armies mentioned above are keeping the store that allocated and only pick out the store when they are working

Attachment # 13
NISA Structure [As of 5th February 2014]



Arms & Ammunitions [1]

Type Arms	Quantity
AK 47	x821
Dashiki	x14
PKM	x22
RPG-7	x22
RPD	x5
Type Ammunitions	Quantity
For AK 47	x35 boxes
For Dashiki	x6 boxes
For PKM	x5 boxes
For RPG-7	x12 boxes

[1] Infrastructure of Armories & Ammunition Depot: Under Construction


Annex # 14

Summary of Arms & Ammunition Imported to Somalia, 2013

No.	Supplier	Item	Date of Notification	Quantity Notified	Quantity Received	Destination of Delivery	Quantity to be Delivered
1	Uganda	AK-47	01 July 2013	1000	1000	700 to Police, 300 to SNA	-
2	Ethiopia	AK Type 56-2	23 July 2013	3,500	2,755	SNA Halane Armoury	745
3	Ethiopia	AK ammunition	23 July 2013	3,000,000	1,944,500	SNA Halane Armoury	1,055,500
4	Ethiopia	PKM machine gun	23 July 2013	100	87	SNA Halane Armoury	13
5	Ethiopia	PKM ammunition	23 July 2013	250,000	150,320	SNA Halane Armoury	99,680
6	Ethiopia	DShK machine gun	23 July 2013	50	46	SNA Halane Armoury	4
7	Djibouti	RPG-7 rockets	12 August 2013	35	35	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region	-
8	Djibouti	Hand grenade (offensive)	12 August 2013	40	40	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region	-
9	Djibouti	Hand grenade (defensive)	12 August 2013	240	240	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region	-
10	Djibouti	MK-19 grenades	12 August 2013	500	500	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region	-
11	Djibouti	AKMS rifles	12 August 2013	560	560	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region	-
12	Djibouti	AKMS magazines	12 August 2013	800	800	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region	-
13	Djibouti	Brevettes de transport	12 August 2013	200	200	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region	-
14	Djibouti	FM SK 40	12 August 2013	20	20	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region	-
15	Djibouti	Mailons (links)	12 August 2013	20 boxes	20 boxes	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region	-
16	Djibouti	PKM machine gun	12 August 2013	10	10	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region	-
17	Djibouti	PKM ammunition	12 August 2013	10 packets	10 packets	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region	-
18	Djibouti	7.62 mm short ammunition	12 August 2013	199,500	199,500	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region	-
19	Djibouti	7.62 mm long ammunition	12 August 2013	79,200	79,200	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region	-
20	Djibouti	Kalashnikovs 39.7.62	03 October 2013	1,000	690	SNA Halane Armoury	310
21	Djibouti	Grenoff	03 October 2013	40	-	SNA Halane Armoury	40
22	Djibouti	DShK 12.7	03 October 2013	10	6	SNA Halane Armoury	4
23	Djibouti	RPG-7	03 October 2013	45	27	SNA Halane Armoury	18
24	Djibouti	7.62 x 39 ammunition	03 October 2013	400,500	291,000	SNA Halane Armoury	109,500
25	Djibouti	7.62 x 54R mm ammunition	03 October 2013	20,000	-	SNA Halane Armoury	20,000
26	Djibouti	12.7 mm ammunition	03 October 2013	49,500	37,500	SNA Halane Armoury	12,000
27	Djibouti	RPG-7 ammunition	03 October 2013	474	372	SNA Halane Armoury	102

Attachment # 15 - A
Notification of Provision of Small Arms, Ammunition & other Military Hardware [12
Aug 2013]

IAMHUURIYADDA FEDERAALKA SOOMAALIYA
Wasaarada Arimaha Dibadda
iyo Iskaashiga Caalamiga



جمهورية الصومال الفيدرالية
وزارة الشؤون الخارجية
والتعاون الدولي

Federal Republic of Somalia

Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation

REF: MFA/OM/1426/2013

12th August, 2013, Mogadishu

H.E. Kim Sook
Chairman
Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea
The United Nations
New York, New York

Re: Notification of Provision of Small Arms, Ammunition and other
Military Hardware.

Your Excellency,

Pursuant to paragraph 33 and 38 of Resolution 2093 (2013), on arms embargo, the
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) hereby notifies the Security Council on
Sanction Committee that the Republic of Djibouti has donated to the Federal Republic
of Somalia the following items:

1. Eleven Vehicles and its accessories
2. One container and Electoral Generator 3.8 KVA
3. Weapon and Ammunition

The detailed description of small arms, ammunition, vehicles and equipment are
specified in the annexes 1, 2 and 3 attached to this document.

The intended recipient of the above mentioned materials is the Somali National Army,
which is now in the process of rebuilding its operational capacity to ensure the
stability and security of Somalia. The delivery is expected at the end of August 2013.

The Federal Republic of Somalia remains committed in observing all international
norms and standards in weapon control and management and will take all measures to
safeguard their custody. The FGS will remain open to any scrutiny.

Excellency, please accept the assurance of my highest consideration

Yours sincerely,

H.E. Fawzia Yusuf H. Adam
Deputy Prime Minister,
Minister of Foreign Affairs
& International Cooperation

Attachment # 15 - B
Notification of Provision of Small Arms, Ammunition & other Military Hardware [12
Aug 2013]

Annex 1: Vehicles and Material

VEHICLES AND MATERIAL

DESIGNATION	QTE	IMMATRICUL	CHASSIS
Toyota Prado	1	21111147	JTEBKK29J730001155
Hummer 12.7	1	654051094	225457
Hummer Ambulance	1	654051097	226919
Toyota L. Cruiser	2	21111111	JTEL71J307082286
		20911030	JTEL71J307082347
Citerne a Eau	1	3111640	HHSHPP12PPM458308
Citerne ACARBURANT	1	3111644	HHSS041468100
VLRA LOT 7	1	7271343	27507
Hummer LG MK19	1	4111137	184196
Gasbir	2	93011318	ABGZ1BC801S041171
		93011316	ABGZ1

TOTAL 11 VEHICLES

DRIVERS

G.E. 3.8 kva Astra	1			
Mirador Mobifeus	1			

Attachment # 15 - B
Notification of Provision of Small Arms, Ammunition & other Military Hardware [12
Aug 2013]

Annex 1: Vehicles and Material

VEHICLES AND MATERIAL

DESIGNATION	QTE	IMMATRICUL	CHASSIS
Toyota Prado	1	21111147	JTEBK29J730001155
Hummer 12 7	1	654051094	225457
Hummer Ambulance	1	654051097	226919
Toyota L. Cruiser	2	21111111	JTEL.B71J307082286
		20911030	JTEL.B71J307082347
Citerne à Eau	1	3111640	1H1SHPP12P0458308
Citerne ACARBURANT	1	3111644	1H1S041468100
VERA LOT 7	1	7271343	27507
Hummer LG MK19	1	4111137	184196
Gasbir	2	93011318	ABGZ1BC801S041171
		93011316	ABGZ1

TOTAL 11 VEHICLES

DRIVERS

G.I. 3,8 kwa Astra	1			
Mirador Mobilisus	1			

Attachment # 15 - C

Notification of Provision of Small Arms, Ammunition & other Military Hardware [12 Aug 2013]

Annex 2: Munitions Restes A Mogadishu

Types de Munitions	Quantite	Observation
Roquette RPG7	35	
Grenade a main OFF	40	12 Caisses
Grenade a main DEF	240	12 Caisses
Grenade LG MK 19	500	

Annex 3: Armaments et Munitions

ARMAMENTS:

- 560 AKMS Cross en Bois avec 800 chargeurs vides + 200 Brevettes de transport;
- 20 (Vigt) FM SK 40 AVEC 20 BOITES DE MAILLONS POR FM, GM/PM POUR LES Transporta;
- 10 (DIX) FM. (PKM) Russe AVEC 10 PAQUETS DE MAILLONS.

MUNITIONS:

- 133 Caisse de 7,62 mm court = 199,500 cartouches
- 90 caisses de 762 mm long = 79,200 cartouches

Attachment # 16
Packing List from Djibouti

TRADUCTION

Le 03 Octobre 2013

Liste des armes

Numéros	Type d'armes	Unité	Nombre de caisse	Détails des caisses	Poids des caisses	Poids total
1	Kalachnikovs 39X7.62	1,000 39X	16	100	74	7,400
2	Grinoff	40 11	1	40	54	2,160
3	DISHKA 12.7	10 14	2	15	82.6	1,239
4	RBJ7	45 13	9	5	100	500
5	Munitions 7.62*39 mm	400,500	1,500	267	28	7,476
6	Munitions 7.62*54 mm	20,000	1,000	20	22	440
7	Munitions 12.7 mm	49,500	150	330	22	7,260
8	Munitions RBJ7 m/d	474	6	79	33	2,507
Total				904		29,082